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Massachusetts v. United States Department ofHealth and Human Services
No. 12-15
Ruling Below: Massachusetts v. Us. Dept. of Health & H1lman Services, 682 F.3d 1 (lst Cir.
2012),petitionfor cert.fzled, 2012 WL 2586937 (U.S. 2012).

Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defines the term "marriage" for all purposes
under federal law as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife."
It also defines "spouse" as "a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." In Gill v.
Office of Personnel Management, seven homosexual couples and three surviving spouses
married in Massachusetts sued to enjoin agencies and officials from enforcing DOMA and
denying them federal benefits that were otherwise available to heterosexual couples. In
Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health and H1Iman Services, Massachusetts
brought a companion case out of concern for losing federal funding for programs such as
Medicaid and veterans' cemeteries. With opinions released on the same day, District Court Judge
Tauro held that Section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, and it
violated the Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment. These cases were joined on appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the district court's decision that DOMA
was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds while rejecting the Spending Clause and Tenth
Amendment rationales.
Question Presented: Whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.c. 7, violates
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the
same sex who are legally married under the laws of their state.

Commonwealth of MASSACHUSETTS, Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et aI.,
Defendants, Appellants.
Dean Hara, Plaintiff, Appellee/Cross-Appellant; Nancy Gill, et aI., Plaintiffs, Appellees;
Keith Toney, et aI., Plaintiffs,
v.
Office of Personnel Management, et aI., Defendants, Appellants/Cross-Appellees; Hillary
Rodham Clinton, in her official capacity as United States Secretary of State, Defendant.

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Decided May 31, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.

These
appeals
present
constitutional
challenges to section 3 of the Defense of
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Marriage Act ("DOMA"), 1 U.S.c. § 7,
which denies federal economic and other
benefits to same-sex couples lawfully
married in Massachusetts and to surviving
spouses from couples thus married. Rather
than challenging the right of states to define
marriage as they see fit, the appeals contest
the right of Congress to undercut the choices
made by same-sex couples and by individual
states in deciding who can be married to
whom.
In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that
it might violate the Hawaii constitution to
deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530 (1993).
Although Hawaii then empowered its
legislature to block such a ruling, Haw.
Const. art. I, § 23-which it did, Act of June
22, 1994, 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 526 (H.B.
2312) (codified at Haw.Rev.Stat. § 5721)-the Hawaii decision was followed by
legalization of same-sex marriage in a small
minority of states, some by statute and a few
by judicial decision; many more states
responded by banning same-sex marriage by
statute or constitutional amendment.
Congress reacted with the same alarm as
many state legislatures. Within three years
after the Hawaii decision, DOMA was
enacted with strong majorities in both
Houses and signed into law by President
Clinton. The entire statute, reprinted in an
addendum to this decision, must-having
only two operative paragraphs-be one of
the shortest major enactments in recent
history. Section 3 of DOMA, 1 U.S.c. § 7,
defines "marriage" for purposes of federal
law:
In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word "marriage" means only a legal

union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word "spouse"
refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife.
Section 2, which is not at issue here,
absolves states from recognizing same-sex
marriages solemnized in other states.
DOMA does not formally invalidate samesex marriages in states that permit them, but
its adverse consequences for such a choice
are considerable. Notably, it prevents samesex married couples from filing joint federal
tax returns, which can lessen tax burdens,
see 26 U.S.C. § 1(a)-(c), and prevents the
surviving spouse of a same-sex marriage
from collecting Social Security survivor
benefits, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 402(f), (i).
DOMA also leaves federal employees
unable to share their health insurance and
certain other medical benefits with same-sex
spouses.
DOMA affects a thousand or more generic
cross-references to marriage in myriad
federal laws. In most cases, the changes
operate to the disadvantage of same-sex
married couples in the half dozen or so
states that permit same-sex marriage. The
number of couples thus affected is estimated
at more than 100,000. Further, DOMA has
potentially serious adverse consequences,
hereafter described, for states that choose to
legalize same-sex marriage.
In Gill v. OPM, No. 10-2207, seven samesex couples married in Massachusetts and
three surviving spouses of such marriages
brought suit in federal district court to enjoin
pertinent federal agencies and officials from
enforcing DOMA to deprive the couples of
federal benefits available to opposite-sex
married couples in Massachusetts. The
Commonwealth brought a companion case,
Massach1lsetts v. DHHS, No. 10-2204,
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concerned that DOMA will revoke federal
funding for programs tied to DOMA's
opposite-sex marriage definition-such as
Massachusetts' state Medicaid program and
veterans' cemeteries.
By combining the income of individuals in
same-sex
marriages,
Massachusetts'
Medicaid program is noncompliant with
DOMA, and the Department of Health and
Human Services, through its Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, has
discretion to rescind Medicaid funding to
noncomplying states. Burying a veteran with
his or her same-sex spouse removes federal
"veterans' cemetery" status and gives the
Department of Veterans' Affairs discretion
to recapture all federal funding for the
cemetery.
The Department of Justice defended DOMA
in the district court but, on July 8, 2010, that
court found section 3 unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause. Gill v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., 699 F.Supp.2d 374, 397
(D.Mass.2010). In the companion case, the
district court accepted the Commonwealth's
argument that section 3 violated the
Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment.
Massachusetts v. u.s. Dep't of Health &
Human Sen!s., 698 F.Supp.2d 234, 249, 253
(D. Mass.20 10).
The district court's judgment declared
section 3 unconstitutional and enjoined the
federal officials and agencies from enforcing
section 3, but the court stayed injunctive
relief pending appeals. The judgment
included specific remedies ordered for the
named plaintiffs in relation to tax, social
security and like claims. With one
qualification--discussed separately belowthe federal defendants have throughout
focused solely upon the district court's
premise that DOMA is unconstitutional.

The Justice Department filed a brief in this
court defending DOMA against all
constitutional claims. Thereafter, altering its
position, the Justice Department filed a
revised brief arguing that the equal
protection claim should be assessed under a
"heightened scrutiny" standard and that
DOMA failed under that standard. It
opposed the separate Spending Clause and
Tenth Amendment claims pressed by the
Commonwealth. The Gill plaintiffs defend
the district court judgment on all three
grounds.
A delay in proceedings followed the Justice
Department's about face while defense of
the statute passed to a group of Republican
leaders of the House of Representativesthe Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group ("the
Legal Group")-who retained counsel and
intervened in the appeal to support section 3.
A large number of amicus briefs have been
filed on both sides of the dispute, some on
both sides proving very helpful to the court.
On appeal from a grant of summary
judgment, our review is de novo, Kuperman
v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir.2011),
and the issues presented are themselves legal
in character, even though informed by
background information as to legislative
purpose and "legislative facts" bearing upon
the rationality or adequacy of distinctions
drawn by statutes. E.g., FCC v. Beach
Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-20
(1993). Such information is normally
noticed by courts with the assistance of
briefs, records and common knowledge.
Daggett v. Comm 'n on Governmental Ethics
& Election Practices, 172 F .3d 104, 112 (l st
Cir.1999).
This case is difficult because it couples
issues of equal protection and federalism
with the need to assess the rationale for a
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congressional statute passed with minimal
hearings and lacking in formal findings. In
addition, Supreme COUli precedent offers
some help to each side, but the rationale in
several cases is open to interpretation. We
have done our best to discern the direction
of these precedents, but only the Supreme
Court can finally decide this unique case.
Although our decision discusses equal
protection
and
federalism
concerns
separately, it concludes that governing
precedents under both heads combine-not
to create some new category of "heightened
scrutiny" for DOMA under a prescribed
algorithm, but rather to require a closer than
usual review based in pati on discrepant
impact among married couples and in part
on the importance of state interests in
regulating marriage. Our decision then tests
the rationales offered for DOMA, taking
account of Supreme Court precedent
limiting which rationales can be counted and
of the force of celiain rationales.
Eqllal Protection. The Legal Group says that
any equal protection challenge to DOMA is
foreclosed at the outset by Baker v. Nelson,
409 U.S. 810 (1972). There, a central claim
made was that a state's refusal to recognize
same-sex marriage violated federal equal
protection principles. Minnesota had, like
DOMA, defined marriage as a union of
persons of the opposite sex, and the state
supreme court had upheld the statute. On
appeal, the Supreme COUli dismissed
summarily for want of a substantial federal
question. ld.
Baker is precedent binding on us unless
repudiated by subsequent Supreme COUli
precedent. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,
344 (1975). Following Baker, "gay rights"
claims prevailed in several well known
decisions, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620

(1996), but neither mandates that the
Constitution requires states to permit samesex marriages. A Supreme Court summary
dismissal "prevent[s] lower courts from
coming to opposite conclusions on the
precise issues presented and necessarily
decided by those actions." Mandel v.
Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per
curiam). Baker does not resolve our own
case but it does limit the arguments to ones
that do not presume or rest on a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage.
Central to this appeal is Supreme Court case
law governing equal protection analysis. The
Gill plaintiffs say that DOMA fails under
the so-called rational basis test, traditionally
used in cases not involving "suspect"
classifications. The federal defendants said
that DOMA would survive such rational
basis scrutiny but now urge, instead, that
DOMA fails under so-called intermediate
scrutiny. In our view, these competing
formulas are inadequate fully to describe
governing precedent.
Certain
suspect
classifications-race,
alienage and national origin-require what
the Court calls strict scrutiny, which entails
both a compelling governmental interest and
narrow tailoring. Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Genderbased classifications invoke intermediate
scrutiny and must be substantially related to
achieving an impOliant governmental
objective. s Both are far more demanding
than rational basis review as conventionally
applied in routine matters of commercial,
tax and like regulation.
Equal protection claims tested by this
rational basis standard, famously called by
Justice Holmes the "last resort of
constitutional argument," Blick v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200,208 (1927), rarely succeed. Courts
accept as adequate any plausible factual
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basis, Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88
(l955), without regard to Congress' actual
motives. Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 314.
Means need not be narrowly drawn to
meet-or even be entirely consistent withthe stated legislative ends. Lee Optical, 348
U.S. at 487-88.
Under such a rational basis standard, the Gill
plaintiffs cannot prevail. Consider only one
of the several justifications for DOMA
offered by Congress itself, namely, that
broadening the definition of marriage will
reduce tax revenues and increase social
security payments. This is the converse of
the very advantages that the Gill plaintiffs
are seeking, and Congress could rationally
have believed that DOMA would reduce
costs, even if newer studies of the actual
economic effects of DOMA suggest that it
may in fact raise costs for the federal
government.
The federal defendants conceded that
rational basis review leaves DOMA intact
but now urge this court to employ the socalled intermediate scrutiny test used by
Supreme Court for gender discrimination.
Some similarity exists between the two
situations along with some differences,
compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 682-88 (l973) (plurality opinion). But
extending intermediate scrutiny to sexual
preference classifications is not a step open
to us.
First, this court in Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d
42 (lst Cir.2008), cert. denied, - U.S. - ,
174 L.Ed.2d 284 (2009), has already
declined to create a major new category of
"suspect
classification"
for
statutes
distinguishing based on sexual preference.
Cook rejected an equal protection challenge
to the now-superceded "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy adopted by Congress for the

military, pointing out that Romer itself
avoided the suspect classification label.
Cook, 528 F.3d at 61-62. This binds the
panel. San J1lan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co.,
612 FJd 25,33 (lst Cir.2010).
Second, to create such a new suspect
classification for same-sex relationships
would have far-reaching implications-in
particular, by implying an overruling of
Baker, which we are neither empowered to
do nor willing to predict. Nothing indicates
that the Supreme Court is about to adopt this
new suspect classification when it
conspicuously failed to do so in Romer-a
case that could readily have been disposed
by such a demarche. That such a
classification could overturn marriage laws
in a huge majority of individual states
underscores the implications.
However, that is not the end of the matter.
Without relying on suspect classifications,
Supreme Court equal protection decisions
have both intensified scrutiny of purported
justifications where minorities are subject to
discrepant treatment and have limited the
permissible justifications. And (as we later
explain), in areas where state regulation has
traditionally governed, the Court may
require that the federal government interest
in intervention be shown with special
clarity.
In a set of equal protection decisions, the
Supreme Court has now several times struck
down state or local enactments without
invoking any suspect classification. In each,
the protesting group was historically
disadvantaged or unpopular, and the
statutory
justification
seemed
thin,
unsupported or impermissible. It is these
decisions-not
classic
rational
basis
review-that the Gill plaintiffs and the
Justice Department most usefully invoke in
their briefs (while seeking to absorb them
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into different and more rigid categorical
lUbrics).

legitimate state interests." Jd. at 632-33,
635.

The oldest of the decisions, u.s. Dept. of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973),
invalidated Congress' decision to exclude
from the food stamp program households
contaInIng
unrelated
individuals.
Disregarding purported justifications that
such households were more likely to
under-report income and to evade
detection, the Court closely sClUtinized the
legislation's fit-finding both that the lUle
disqualified many otherwise-eligible and
particularly needy households, and a "bare
congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group." Jd. at 534, 537-38.

These three decisions did not adopt some
new category of suspect classification or
employ rational basis review in its
minimalist form; instead, the Court rested on
the case-specific nature of the discrepant
treatment, the burden imposed, and the
infirmities of the justifications offered.
Several Justices have remarked on thisboth favorably, City of Cleb1lrne, 473 U.S.
at 451-55 (1985) (Stevens, 1., concurring),
and unfavorably, United States v. Virginia
(VMJ), 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, 1.,
dissenting).

The second, City of Cleb1lrne v. Cleb1lrne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), overturned
a local ordinance as applied to the denial of
a special permit for operating a group home
for the mentally disabled. The Court found
unconvincing interests like protecting the
inhabitants against the risk of flooding,
given that nursing or convalescent homes
were allowed without a permit; mental
disability too had no connection to alleged
concerns about popUlation density. All that
remained were "mere negative attitudes, or
fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are
In
a
zonmg
properly
cognizable
proceeding." Jd. at 448.
Finally, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996), the Court struck down a provision in
Colorado's
constitution
prohibiting
regulation to protect homosexuals from
discrimination.
The
Court,
calling
"unprecedented" the "disqualification of a
class of persons from the right to seek
specific protection from the law," deemed
the provision a "status-based enactment
divorced from any factual context from
which we could discern a relationship to

Circuit courts, citing these same cases, have
similarly concluded that equal protection
assessments
are
sensitive
to
the
circumstances of the case and not dependent
entirely on abstract categorizations. As one
distinguished judge observed:
Judges and commentators have noted
that the usually deferential "rational
basis" test has been applied with
greater rigor in some contexts,
particularly those in which courts
have had reason to be concerned
about possible discrimination.

United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 468 (2d
Cir.1995) (Calabresi, 1., concurring) (citing
City of Cleb1lrne as an example). There is
nothing remarkable about this: categories
are often approximations and are themselves
constructed by weighing of underlying
elements.
All three of the cited cases-Moreno, City of
Cleb1lrne and Romer-stressed the historic
patterns of disadvantage suffered by the
group adversely affected by the statute. As
with the women, the poor and the mentally
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impaired, gays and lesbians have long been
the subject of discrimination. Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 571. The COUli has in these cases
undetiaken a more careful assessment of the
justifications than the light scrutiny offered
by conventional rational basis review.
As for burden, the combined effect of
DOMA's restrictions on federal benefits will
not prevent same-sex marriage where
permitted under state law; but it will
penalize those couples by limiting tax and
social security benefits to opposite-sex
couples in their own and all other states. For
those married same-sex couples of which
one partner is in federal service, the other
cannot take advantage of medical care and
other benefits available to opposite-sex
partners in Massachusetts and everywhere
else in the country.
These burdens are comparable to those the
Court found substantial in Moreno, City of
Cleburne, and Romer. Moreno, like this
case,
involved meaningful economic
benefits; City of Cleburne involved the
opportunity to secure housing; Romer, the
chance to secure equal protection of the laws
on the same terms as other groups. Loss of
survivor's social security, spouse-based
medical care and tax benefits are major
detriments on any reckoning; provision for
retirement and medical care are, in practice,
the main components of the social safety net
for vast numbers of Americans.
Accordingly, we conclude that the extreme
deference accorded to ordinary economic
legislation in cases like Lee Optical would
not be extended to DOMA by the Supreme
Court;
and
without
insisting
on
"compelling" or "impoliant" justifications or
"narrow tailoring," the Court would
scrutinize with care the purported bases for
the legislation. Before providing such
scrutiny, a separate element absent in

Moreno, City of Cleburne, and Romerfederalism-must be considered.
Federalism. In assailing DOMA, the
plaintiffs and especially the Commonwealth
rely directly on limitations attributed to the
Spending Clause of the Constitution and the
Tenth Amendment; the Justice Department,
along with the Legal Group, rejects those
claims. In our view, neither the Tenth
Amendment nor the Spending Clause
invalidates DOMA; but Supreme COUli
precedent relating to federalism-based
challenges to federal laws reinforce the need
for closer than usual scrutiny of DOMA's
justifications and diminish somewhat the
deference ordinarily accorded.
It is true that DOMA intrudes extensively
into a realm that has from the start of the
nation been primarily confided to state
regulation-domestic relations and the
definition
and
incidents
of lawful
marriage-which is a leading instance of the
states' exercise of their broad police-power
authority over morality and culture. As the
Supreme Court observed long ago,

[t]he whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, belongs to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the
United States.
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581
(1979) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593-94 (1890)); see also Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1,7 (1967)(marriage).

Consonantly, Congress has never purported
to lay down a general code defining
marriage or purporting to bind the states to
such a regime. Rather, in individual
situations-such as the anti-fraud criteria in
immigration
law,
8
U.S.C.
§
1186a(b)(1 )(A)(i)-Congress has provided
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its own definitions limited to the particular
program or personnel involved. But no
precedent exists for DOMA's sweeping
general "federal" definition of marriage for
all federal statutes and programs.
Nevertheless, Congress surely has an
interest in who counts as married. The
statutes and programs that section 3 governs
are federal regimes such as social security,
the Internal Revenue Code and medical
insurance for federal workers; and their
benefit structure requires deciding who is
married to whom. That Congress has
traditionally looked to state law to determine
the answer does not mean that the Tenth
Amendment or Spending Clause require it to
do so.
Supreme Court interpretations of the Tenth
Amendment have varied over the years but
those in force today have struck down
statutes only where Congress sought to
commandeer state governments or otherwise
directly dictate the internal operations of
state government. Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Whatever its spin-off effects, section 3
governs only federal programs and funding,
and does not share these two vices of
commandeering or direct command.
Neither does DOMA run afoul of the
"germaneness" requirement that conditions
on federal funds must be related to federal
purposes. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203, 207-08 (1987). The requirement is not
implicated where, as here, Congress merely
defines the telms of the federal benefit. In
Dole, the Supreme COUli upheld a condition
by which federal funds for highway
construction depended on a state's adoption
of a minimum drinking age for all driving on
state roadways. 483 U.S. at 205. DOMA

merely limits the use of federal funds to
prescribed purposes.
However, the denial of federal benefits to
same-sex couples lawfully married does
of states like
burden the
choice
Massachusetts to regulate the rules and
incidents of marriage; notably, the
Commonwealth stands both to assume new
administrative burdens and to lose funding
for Medicaid or veterans' cemeteries solely
on account of its same-sex marriage laws.
These consequences do not violate the Tenth
Amendment or Spending Clause, but
Congress' effort to put a thumb on the scales
and influence a state's decision as to how to
shape its own marriage laws does bear on
how the justifications are assessed.
In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995), the Supreme Court scrutinized
with special care federal statutes intruding
on matters customarily within state control.
The lack of adequate and persuasive
findings led the Court in both cases to
invalidate the statutes under the Commerce
Clause even though nothing more than
rational basis review is normally afforded in
such cases.
The Supreme Comi has made somewhat
similar statements about the need for
scrutiny when examining federal statutes
intruding on regulation of state election
processes. Nw. A1lstin Mun. Uti!. Dist. No.
One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009); cf City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534
( 1997) (calling RFRA a "considerable
congressional intrusion into the States'
traditional
prerogatives
and
general
authority to regulate for the health and
welfare of their citizens").
True, these federalism cases examined the
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reach of federal power under the Commerce
Clause and other sources of constitutional
authority not invoked here; but a statute that
violates equal protection is likewise beyond
the power of Congress. See Moreno, 413
U.S. at 541, (Douglas, J., concurring). Given
that DOMA intrudes broadly into an area of
traditional state regulation, a closer
examination of the justifications that would
prevent DOMA from violating equal
protection (and thus from exceeding federal
authority) is uniquely reinforced by
federalism concerns.
DOMA's Rationales. Despite its ramifying
application throughout the U.S. Code, only
one day of hearings was held on DOMA,
Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R.
3396 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Congo (1996) ("Hearing"),
and none of the testimony concerned
DOMA's effects on the numerous federal
programs at issue. Some of the odder
consequences of DOMA testify to the speed
with which it was adopted.

The statute, only a few paragraphs in length,
is devoid of the express prefatory findings
commonly made in major federal laws. E.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-1; 16 U.S.C. § 1531; 20
U.S.C. § 1400; 21 U.S.C. § 801; 29 U.S.C. §
151; id. § 1001; 42 U.S.c. § 7401.
Accordingly, in discerning and assessing
Congress' basis for DOMA our main resort
is the House Committee report and, in lesser
measure, to variations of its themes
advanced in the briefs before us. The
committee report stated:
[T]he Committee briefly discusses
four of the governmental interests
advanced by this legislation: (l)
defending
and
nmiuring
the
institution
of
traditional,
heterosexual marriage; (2) defending

traditional notions of morality; (3)
protecting state sovereignty and
democratic self-governance; and (4)
preserving
scarce
government
resources.
H.R.Rep. No. 104-664, at 12 (1996), 1996
u.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2916.
The penultimate reason listed above was not
directed to section 3-indeed, is antithetical
to it-but was concerned solely with section
2, which reserved a state's power not to
recognize same-sex marriages performed in
other states. Thus, we begin with the others,
reserving for separate consideration the
claim strongly pressed by the Gill plaintiffs
that DOMA should be condemned because
its unacknowledged but alleged central
motive was hostility to homosexuality.
First, starting with the most concrete of the
cited
reasons-"preserving
scarce
government resources"-it is said that
DOMA will save money for the federal
government by limiting tax savings and
avoiding social security and other payments
to spouses. This may well be true, or at least
might have been thought true; more detailed
recent analysis indicates that DOMA is more
likely on a net basis to cost the government
money.
But, where the distinction is drawn against a
historically disadvantaged group and has no
other basis, Supreme COUli precedent marks
this as a reason undermining rather than
bolstering the distinction. Plyler V. Doe, 457
U.S. 202,227 (1982); Romer, 517 U.S. at
635. The reason, derived from equal
protection analysis, is that such a group has
historically been less able to protect itself
through the political process. Plyler, 457
U.S. at 218 n. 14; United States V. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (l938).
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A second rationale of a pragmatic character,
advanced by the Legal Group's brief and
several others, is to support child-rearing in
the context of stable marriage. The evidence
as to child rearing by same-sex couples is
the subject of controversy, but we need not
enter the debate. Whether or not children
raised by opposite-sex marriages are on
average better served, DOMA cannot
preclude same-sex couples in Massachusetts
from adopting children or prevent a woman
patiner from giving birth to a child to be
raised by both partners.
Although the House Repoli is filled with
encomia to heterosexual marriage, DOMA
does not increase benefits to opposite-sex
couples-whose marriages may in any event
be childless, unstable or both-or explain
how denying benefits to same-sex couples
will reinforce heterosexual marriage.
Certainly, the denial will not affect the
gender choices of those seeking marriage.
This is not merely a matter of poor fit of
remedy to perceived problem, Lee Optical,
348 U.S. at 487-88; City of Cleb1lrne, 473
U.S. at 446-50, but a lack of any
demonstrated connection between DOMA's
treatment of same-sex couples and its
asserted goal of strengthening the bonds and
benefits to society of heterosexual marriage.
A third reason, moral disapproval of
homosexuality, lS one of DOMA's stated
justifications:
Civil laws that permit only
heterosexual marriage reflect and
honor a collective moral judgment
about
human
sexuality.
This
judgment
entails
both
moral
disapproval of homosex1lality, and a
moral conviction that heterosexuality
better comports with traditional
(especially
Judeo-Christian)
morality.

H.R.Rep. No. 104-664, at 15-16 (emphasis
added); see a/so, e.g., 142 Congo Rec.
16,972 (1996) (statement of Rep. Coburn)
(homosexuality "morally wrong").
For generations, moral disapproval has been
taken as an adequate basis for legislation,
although usually in choices made by state
legislators to whom general police power is
entrusted. But, speaking directly of samesex preferences, Lawrence ruled that moral
disapproval alone cannot justify legislation
discriminating on this basis. 539 U.S. at
577-78. Moral judgments can hardly be
avoided in legislation, but Lawrence and
Romer have undercut this basis. Cj Palmore
V. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,433 (1984).
Finally, it has been suggested by the Legal
Group's brief that, faced with a prospective
change in state marriage laws, Congress was
entitled to "freeze" the situation and reflect.
But the statute was not framed as a
temporary time-out; and it has no expiration
date, such as one that Congress included in
the Voting Rights Act. See Nw. A1lstin, 129
S.Ct. at 251 0 (describing original expiration
date and later extensions); City of Boerne,
521 U.S. at 533. The House Report's own
arguments-moral, prudential and fiscalmake clear that DOMA was not framed as a
temporary measure.
Congress did emphasize a related concern,
based on the Hawaii Supreme Court's
decision in Baehr, that state judges would
impose same-sex marriage on unwilling
states. H.R.Rep. No. 104-664, at 5-6, 12,
16-17. But almost all states have readily
amended constitutions, as well as elected
judges, and can protect themselves against
what their citizens may regard as
overreaching. The fear that Hawaii could
impose same-sex marriage on sister states
through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, id.
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at 7-9, relates solely to section 2 of DOMA,
which is not before us.
We conclude, without resort to suspect
classifications or any impairment of Baker,
that the rationales offered do not provide
adequate suppOli for section 3 of DOMA.
Several of the reasons given do not match
the statute and several others are diminished
by specific holdings in Supreme Comi
decisions more or less directly on point. If
we are right in thinking that disparate impact
on minority interests and federalism
concerns both require somewhat more in this
case than almost automatic deference to
Congress' will, this statute fails that test.
Invalidating a federal statute is an
unwelcome responsibility for federal judges;
the elected Congress speaks for the entire
nation, its judgment and good faith being
entitled to utmost respect. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality
opinion). But a lower federal court such as
ours must follow its best understanding of
governing precedent, knowing that in large
matters the Supreme Court will correct misreadings (and even if it approves the result
will formulate its own explanation).
In reaching our judgment, we do not rely
upon the charge that DOMA's hidden but
dominant purpose was hostility to
homosexuality. The many legislators who
supported DOMA acted from a variety of
motives, one central and expressed aim
being to preserve the heritage of marriage as
traditionally defined over centuries of
Western civilization. See H.R.Rep. No. 104664, at 12, 16. Preserving this institution is
not the same as "mere moral disapproval of
an excluded group," Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
585 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and that is
singularly so in this case given the range of
bipartisan support for the statute.

The opponents of section 3 point to selected
comments from a few individual legislators;
but the motives of a small group cannot taint
a statute supported by large majorities in
both Houses and signed by President
Clinton. Traditions are the glue that holds
society together, and many of our own
traditions rest largely on belief and
familiarity-not on benefits firmly provable
in court. The desire to retain them is strong
and can be honestly held.
For 150 years, this desire to maintain
tradition would alone have been justification
enough for almost any statute. This judicial
deference has a distinguished lineage,
including such figures as Justice Holmes,
the second Justice Harlan, and Judges
Learned Hand and Henry Friendly. But
Supreme Court decisions in the last fifty
years call for closer scrutiny of government
action touching upon minority group
interests and of federal action in areas of
traditional state concern.
To conclude, many Americans believe that
marriage is the union of a man and a
woman, and most Americans live in states
where that is the law today. One viliue of
federalism is that it permits this diversity of
governance based on local choice, but this
applies as well to the states that have chosen
to legalize same-sex marriage. Under current
Supreme Court authority, Congress' denial
of federal benefits to same-sex couples
lawfully married in Massachusetts has not
been adequately supported by any
permissible federal interest.
Hara's Health Benefits Claim. A distinct, if
much narrower, issue is raised by Dean
Hara, one of the Gill plaintiffs. Although the
district court ordered the relief Hara sought
for Social Security lump-sum death benefits,
the district comi found that relief on his
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second claim for health coverage required a
further determination on a precondition that
is the subject of a proceeding earlier brought
by Hara and now pending in the Federal
Circuit. Hara v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No.
2009-3134 (Fed.Cir. docketed Mar. 17,
2009).
Hara was married under Massachusetts law
to a now-deceased Congressman, and Hara
has sought to be enrolled as a surviving
spouse for health benefits under the
Congressman's Federal Employees' Health
Benefit Plan ("FEHBP"). For this, (1) Hara
would have to be an eligible "annuitant"
under the annuity statute, and (2) the
Congressman had to have enrolled in the
health benefit plan for "self and family,"
which he had not done. 5 U.S.C. § 8341; 5
C.F.R. §§ 890.303(c), 890.302(a)(1).
Acting on an application by Hara for a
survivor annuity benefit, the Office of
Personnel Management ("OPM") had
previously ruled that Hara was ineligible to
receive an annuity both because he was not a
spouse under DOMA and because the
Congressman had not elected such coverage.
Such determinations as to annuities are
reviewed exclusively by the Merit Systems
Protection Board ("MSPB" or "Board") and
then exclusively by the Federal Circuit. 5
U.S.c. §§ 8347, 8341, 7703(b)(1); 28
U.S.C. 1295(a)(9).
On review, the Board upheld the denial of
coverage solely because of DOMA, finding
the failure to elect coverage not to bar
annuitant status. Hara sought further review
in the Federal Circuit, and that case has been
stayed pending resolution of the DOMA
issue in this circuit. Hara, No. 2009-3134

(Oct. 15, 2010 order staying proceedings).
Thus, now-as at the time the district court
issued its judgment-a Board determination
is in force that Hara lacks annuitant status.
OPM has separately denied Hara's claim for
FEHBP health enrollment because of the
Congressman's failure to elect "self and
family" coverage. Although the district court
found DOMA unconstitutional, it refused to
resolve Hara's health coverage claim now
because it still depends on Hara establishing
eligibility for annuitant status, which is at
issue in his pending Federal Circuit appeal.
Whether or not Hara lacked standing, the
district court showed prudence in deferring
on this issue to the Federal Circuit.
Hara says in substance that the Federal
Circuit has to recognize his annuitant status
because the Board has waived or forfeited
any objection based on the failure to elect
spousal survivor coverage; but the
Department of Justice does not concede the
point, which the Federal Circuit presumably
will resolve. If Hara prevails there, district
court injunctive relief to secure his health
coverage is likely to be unnecessary, but our
affirmance is without prejudice to such a
future request by Hara.
The judgment of the district court is
affirmed for the reasons and to the extent
stated above. Anticipating that certiorari will
be sought and that Supreme Court review of
DOMA is highly likely, the mandate is
stayed, maintaining the district court's stay
of its injunctive judgment, pending further
order of this court. The parties will bear
their own costs on these appeals.
It is so ordered.
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"Suit Cites States' Rights on Behalf of Gay Rights"
The New York Times
July 9,2012
Adam Liptak
The day after the Supreme Court announced
its decision upholding President Obama's
health care law, the next constitutional
blockbuster arrived at the court.

It is a rematch between the main lawyers in
the health care case, and it replays some of
the same themes. But now the issue is samesex marrIage.
The question, again, is whether a federal
law-this time the Defense of Marriage Act,
or DOMA-passes constitutional muster.
The law says the federal government must
deny benefits to gay couples who are
married in states that allow such unions. The
law excludes same-sex spouses from
benefits like Social Security payments,
health insurance and burial services.
"Until DOMA is repealed or invalidated,"
explained Walter Dellinger, who was acting
United States solicitor general in the Clinton
administration, "no gay couple is fully
married."
(It is worth pausing to point out what the
new case is not about. It does not concern
the law's other main part, the one that says
states need not recogmze same-sex
marriages from other states. It is also not
about the more ambitious arguments made
in a suit filed in California by Theodore B.
Olson and David Boies, which seeks to
establish a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage.)

The federal appeals court in Boston on May
31 struck down the part of the marriage law
that concerns federal benefits, saying there

was no good reason to treat some married
couples differently from others.
On June 29, Paul D. Clement, who had
learned the day before that he had largely
lost the health care case, was back at the
Supreme Court. He asked the justices to hear
an appeal from the Boston decision and
uphold the marriage law.
Four days later, Solicitor General Donald B.
Verrilli Jr., who had successfully defended
the health care law, agreed that the new case
warranted review. But he said the justices
should strike down the marriage law.
The appeals court ruling in Boston was
largely based on equal protection principles.
But there was a dash of federalism in it, too,
one reminiscent of arguments in the health
care case.
Marriages have traditionally been governed
by state law, Judge Michael Boudin wrote
for a unanimous three-judge panel of the
appeals court, raising federalism concerns
that warranted a close look at whether the
marriage law was justified.
The trial judge, Joseph L. Tauro, had gone
further, saying the marriage law overstepped
Congress's power to attach conditions to
federal grants to states. For instance, Judge
Tauro wrote, the Department of Veterans
Affairs had threatened to take back some
$19 million from Massachusetts if it allowed
the burial of a veteran's same-sex spouse in
a cemetery that had been built and
maintained with federal money.
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Most people did not take that part of Judge
Tauro's opinion very seriously, and the
appeals court rejected it. But that was a
month before the Supreme Court limited the
health care law's Medicaid expansion along
similar lines.
The important point about federalism, said
Mr.
Dellinger, the
former Clinton
administration lawyer, is that two interests
that are sometimes at odds in cases about
same-sex marriage line up here. "Gay rights
and states' rights are on the same side of the
case," he said.
Mr. Verrilli, for his part, finds himself in an
awkward position. It is ordinarily the job of
the executive branch to defend laws enacted
by Congress, and the Justice Department did
defend the marriage law early in the Obama
administration. Last year, though, Attorney
General Eric H. Holder Jr. announced an
about-face, saying he and President Obama
had concluded that the law was
unconstitutional.
The administration would continue to
enforce the law, Mr. Holder said, but would
no longer defend it in court.
After the administration's move, House
Republicans intervened in the case to defend
the law. They turned to Mr. Clement, who
sometimes seems to be handling every
important case on the Supreme Court
docket.

In his Supreme Court petition, Mr. Clement
wrote that the justices should hear the case
because legislators were not equipped to
litigate. "The House has been forced into the

posItIOn of defending numerous lawsuits
challenging DOMA across the nation," he
said. "That is a role for which the Justice
Department-not
the
House-is
institutionally designed."
The seven same-sex couples and three
surviving spouses actually challenging the
law have yet to be heard from, and they will
presumably urge the Supreme Court to deny
review. But there is every reason to think the
court will agree to hear the case, or a similar
one from California, shortly after the
justices return from their summer break,
with arguments around January and a
decision by June.
Both sides will be looking for suppOli in the
principles that animated the health care
decision. In his petition, Mr. Clement quoted
an observation from Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr., one of Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr.'s touchstones, that "judging the
constitutionality of an act of Congress is the
gravest and most delicate duty that this court
is called on to perform."
Mr. Verrilli went his adversary one better,
actually citing the five-day-old health care
National
Federation
of
decision,
Independent B1Isiness v. Sebelius, in what
was probably its first appearance in a
Supreme COUli brief. In the health care case,
Mr. Verrilli reminded the justices, they
appointed lawyers to argue positions that
neither party had embraced. In the marriage
case, where both the plaintiffs and the
Justice Department now agree that the law is
unconstitutional, Mr. Verrilli said, it would
similarly be sensible to allow Mr. Clement
to have his say.
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"U.S. Files DOMA Challenges"
SCOTUSblog
July 3, 2012
Lyle Denniston

Seeking a clear-cut Supreme Court ruling
against Congress's power to ban federal
benefits for legally married same-sex
couples, the Obama Administration on
Tuesday afternoon filed two cases, and
urged the Justices to allow the House GOP
leaders to defend the law that the
is
government
now
believes
unconstitutional. One petition ... involves a
First Circuit Court ruling against the ban
included in the Defense of Marriage Act.
The second . . . asked the Court to pull up a
case now pending in the Ninth Circuit
Comi-a case in which a federal District
judge in California nullified the ban.
Although the Administration believes, after
changing its position last year, that DOMA's
Section 3 is invalid, and thus agrees with the
lower court rulings, it contended that it still
has the authority to be the one to appeal in
order "to ensure that the judiciary is the final
arbiter" of the issue. The House's
Republican leaders, who have taken over the
defense of DOMA, have already filed their
own petition (now docketed as 12-13), but
the government lawyers argued that the
legislators do not have a legal right to appeal
but should be allowed to take pati in the
case anyway. If the lawmakers are allowed
to do so, the new filing said, the Court need
not rule on whether they were legally
entitled to bring their own appeal.
DOMA is a 1996 law signed by President
Bill Clinton and passed with huge majorities
in the House and Senate. It has two main
provisions, but only one of those is at stake
in the new cases. That is the provision that
says that, whenever marriage is mentioned

in a federal program or gets favored
treatment as in the tax code, that means only
a legally married man and woman. The other
provision attempts to give the states a legal
right to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages that are performed in other states.
Gay rights advocates also oppose that
provision, but it is not being put before the
Court.
The constitutional challenge to its marriage
definition is not an attempt to establish a
federal constitutional right for gays and
lesbians to marry. In fact, the couples
challenging DOMA are already legally
married under their own states' laws, and are
contending that excluding them from equal
legal treatment is a form of unconstitutional
discrimination. That was the basis for the
First Circuit Court's ruling against Section 3
at the end of May, and by U.S. District
Judge Jeffrey White in San Francisco in
February.
Judge White's decision is now under review,
on an expedited schedule in the Ninth
Circuit, but by filing its petition in the
Supreme Court at this stage, the Obama
Administration sought to bypass that judicial
rung in order to have a fuller review done by
the Supreme Comi. The filing will have the
effect of putting the Ninth Circuit's review
on hold in the meantime.
In urging that the Court put the Ninth Circuit
case on a fast track to the Supreme Court,
the new petition said that "authoritative
resolution of the question is of great
importance to the United States," to the
individual federal court employee in the
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case, and to "tens of thousands of others
who are being denied the equal enjoyment
of the benefits that federal law makes
available to persons who are legally married
under state law."
Because both cases involve decisions that
struck down a federal law, the chances are
very strong that the Supreme Court will
accept at least one of them for review in the
next Term, opening October 1. The Court
will not consider them during its summer
recess, but they could be ready for action by
the Justices at their first private Conference,
now set for September 24.
One of the key issues that will be before the
Court is the constitutional test the Justices
would apply to the federal ban. Although the
Court has decided a number of major gay
rights cases, it has never declared a specific
standard-that is, it has not said whether a
law need only have a "rational basis,"
whether it should have to meet some level of
"heightened scrutiny," or whether it should
have to satisfy the toughest test of all: "strict
scrutiny." It has applied a variation of
rational basis, without saying that should
control in other cases.
In the First Circuit, a somewhat mixed
standard was applied, but Judge White

applied "heightened scrutiny," as both of
those courts nullified the federal ban. The
Justice Department has now embraced the
"heightened scrutiny" test and concluded
that the ban cannot meet that hurdle. It has
said, though, that it will continue to enforce
the ban until its constitutionality is finally
settled.
The new cases have not yet been assigned
docket numbers. Another same-sex marriage
case is on its way to the Court, involving the
constitutionality of California's voterapproved "Proposition 8," banning all samesex marriages in that state. That cases thus
raises a different constitutional issue than
DOMA, involving whether a state is free to
ban such marriages altogether. That case, as
it went through the Ninth Circuit, became
considerably narrower than it had been in
District Court, but the Circuit Court did
nullifY the state constitutional amendment
approved as a ballot measure.
UPDATED July 4: The government
petitions on DOMA have been docketed as
12-15 (First Circuit case) and 12- I 6 (District
Court-Northern California case). The House
GOP leaders' petition filed earlier is
docketed as 12-13 (First Circuit case). The
responses to all three are due August 2,
unless extended.)
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"Key Part of Federal Gay Marriage Law
Ruled Unconstitutional"
The Los Angeles Times
May31,2012
David G. Savage

Advocates of same-sex marriage won a
major legal victory-and greatly increased
the odds of a U.S. Supreme Court
showdown on the subject-as an appeals
court ruled that the government could not
deny tax, Social Security and other federal
benefits to gay couples who were legally
married in their home states.
The ruling struck down a major part of the
Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA, the
law adopted in 1996 that denied federal
benefits to same-sex couples. The Obama
administration had urged the court to
overturn the law, saying it violated the
constitutional rights of gay couples.
The 3-0 decision by the federal appeals
court in Boston sends the gay marriage issue
toward the Supreme Court on two tracks.
One track directly involves whether gays
and lesbians have a constitutional right to
marry. In that case, a federal appeals court in
San Francisco shuck down California's
Proposition 8, which had reversed the state
Supreme Court's decision. The other trackthe current case-involves whether gay
couples, once legally married, have a right
to equal treatment.
Both cases are likely to be appealed to the
Supreme Court this year. The judges in
Boston made it clear they had that in mind,
and seemed to be tailoring their opinion for
JusticeAnthony M. Kennedy. The U.S. 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals also tailored its

Proposition 8 opinion for Kennedy, who is
likely to be the swing vote.
The Boston-based judges of the U.S. 1st
Circuit Court of Appeals, two of whom are
Republican appointees, sounded a states'
rights theme in Thursday's opInIOn.
Marriage is a matter of state law, they said.
And as such, they saw no valid justification
for the federal government to "penalize"
legally married same-sex couples by
denying them the same benefits available to
all other married couples. These include
filing a joint tax return, obtaining family
healthcare coverage for the spouse of a
federal employee or receiving a survivor's
benefit from Social Security.
The Obama administration had reached the
same conclusion last year and refused to
defend this part of the law. House
Republicans, led by SpeakerJohn A.
Boehner of Ohio, vowed to carryon the
defense. They hired Washington lawyer Paul
Clement to argue in favor of limiting federal
recognition of marriage to a "legal umon
between one man and one woman."
White House Press Secretary Jay Carney
said President Obama agreed with the
court's decision. The administration sent a
lawyer to Boston to argue for striking down
part of DOMA as a violation of equal
protection.
"There's no question that this [decision] is
in concert with the president's views,"
Carney said.
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Congress passed DOMA to prevent a gay
marriage in one state from being accorded
legal recognition in other states. This
provision was not at issue in Thursday's
decision. Instead, the ruling arose from a
challenge to the federal benefits provision
filed by seven same-sex couples who were
married in Massachusetts and sought equal
benefits as married couples.
The judges steered clear of strong wording
or sweeping conclusions about the legal
status of gays. They did, however, cite
Kennedy's 1996 opinion that stlUck down an
anti-gay voter initiative in Colorado.
The judges in Boston conceded their lUling
was only a stepping stone.
"Only the Supreme Court can finally decide
this unique case," Judge Michael Boudin
wrote. They put their decision on hold until
the law's defenders could appeal.
Clement pledged to do just that. "We have
always been clear we expect this matter
ultimately to be decided by the Supreme
Court, and that has not changed," he said.
Nonetheless, gay rights advocates hailed the
lUling as another step toward full legal
equality for gays and lesbians.
DOMA created "a classic double standard,
whereby gay people were singled out for
discrimination," said Mary Bonauto, a
lawyer for Gay & Lesbian Advocates &
Defenders, the Boston-based group that sued
on behalf of the seven same-sex couples.
The lead plaintiff, Nancy Gill, is a postal
worker who sought health benefits for her
spouse. Massachusetts filed a similar suit
against the government, stressing the states'
rights issue.

Suzanne Goldberg, a Columbia University
law professor, said the court's opinion
"helps to sound the death knell for DOMA.
The 1st Circuit explained, clearly and
simply, that denying same-sex couples the
benefits of marriage will not support
heterosexuals' marriages."
The National Organization for Marriage
sharply criticized the lUling. "It's obvious
that the federal courts on both coasts are
intent on imposing their liberal, elitist views
of marriage on the American people," said
Brian Brown, the group's president. "They
dismiss the centuries-old understanding of
marriage as a critical social institution that
exists for the benefit of couples and their
children."
The Massachusetts state high court was the
nation's first, in 2003, to declare gays and
lesbians had a right to marry. Since then,
more than 100,000 same-sex couples have
wed legally there and in other states where
gay marriage was legal, according to the
cOUli's OpInIOn. That includes Iowa,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York,
Vermont and, before Proposition 8,
California. Two other states, Washington
and Maryland, have passed gay marriage
laws that could face voter initiatives in
November. The District of Columbia also
permits same-sex marriage.
The opinion by Boudin, an appointee of
President George H.W. Bush, was joined by
Chief Judge Sandra Lynch, a Bill Clinton
appointee, and Judge Juan TorlUella, a
Ronald Reagan appointee.
The broader right-to-marry issue is likely to
reach the high court in the California case,
now awaiting a possible review by the full
U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
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A federal judge in San Francisco and a
three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit struck
down Proposition 8, the voter initiative that
limited marriage to a man and a woman.
Both decisions relied on the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

Defenders of Proposition 8 asked the full 9th
Circuit to review the panel's decision. If that
fails, they can appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
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"Appeals Court Hears Arguments on Gay Marriage Law"
The New York Times
April 4, 2012
Abby Goodnough
A federal appeals court panel heard
arguments Wednesday on whether to uphold
a lower couti's finding that a section of the
1996 law banning federal recognition of
same-sex marriage is unconstitutional.
The case is the first challenge to the socalled Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA,
to reach a federal appeals couti. In July
2010, Judge Joseph L. Tauro of the United
States District Court in Boston sided with
the plaintiffs in two separate cases brought
by the state attorney general and a gay rights
group.
One issue under consideration is whether the
law wrongly denies federal benefits, like
Social Security survivors' payments and the
right to file taxes jointly, to married samesex couples, thus violating their equal
protection rights.
In the case brought by Matiha Coakley, the
Massachusetts attorney general, Judge Tauro
found in 2010 that DOMA compels
Massachusetts to discriminate against gay
couples who are legally married under state
law in order for the commonwealth to
receive federal money for certain programs.
The other case, brought by Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders, focused more
narrowly on equal protection as applied to
federal benefits. In that case, Judge Tauro
agreed in 20 I 0 that the law violated the
equal protection clause of the Constitution
by denying benefits to one class of married
couples-gay men and lesbians-but not
others.

The Obama administration initially appealed
the lower court's ruling. But last year, the
Justice Depatiment announced that it would
stop defending DOMA, leaving Congress to
appeal Judge Tauro's ruling to the First
Circuit. The House of Representatives'
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group stepped in,
hiring Paul D. Clement, a former United
States solicitor general, to argue the appeal.
Massachusetts became the first state in the
country to allow same-sex marriage in 2004.
Other states have followed, and gay rights
suppOliers are hoping that a series of legal
challenges to DOMA around the country
will ultimately lead to a Supreme Court
ruling on the law. Judge Tauro struck down
the section of the law that defines marriage
as the union of a man and a woman for all
federal purposes.
At the federal coutihouse here on
Wednesday, the arguments focused on what
the appropriate constitutional test for
DOMA should be: the relatively easy
standard known as "rational basis," or a
tougher review that requires heightened
scrutiny.
Mr. Clement-who last week argued before
the Supreme Court on behalf of states
challenging President Obama's health care
law-told the appeals panel that Congress
had a rational basis for defining marriage as
between a man and a woman. He said that in
1996, as Hawaii appeared to be the first state
moving toward recognizing same-sex
marriage, Congress passed the law out of
concern that it should have its own
definition of marriage.
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"Congress could rationally choose to have a
uniform definition rather than have it rely
upon state law," Mr. Clement said.
But Mary Bonauto, who argued on behalf of
Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders,
said that "the central question is what
federal interest is served in singling out only
same-sex marriages" as invalid.
"We believe the Defense of Marriage Act is
an irrational, arbitrary classification of gay
people for its own sake and not for any other
purpose," she said.
In the Coakley case, Judge Tauro had held
that that federal restrictions on financing for
states that recognize same-sex marriage
violates the 10th Amendment-the part of
the Constitution that declares that rights not
explicitly granted to the federal government,
or denied to the states, belong to the states.
Maura Healey, the assistant attorney general
who argued on behalf of Ms. Coakley, told
the
panel
that
DOMA
requires
Massachusetts "to live with two distinct and
unequal forms of marriage." She added,
"This is a burden that Congress has imposed
on Massachusetts simply because it doesn't

like the fact that gay. people are getting
married."
Stuart F. Delery, the Justice Department's
acting assistant attorney general for the civil
division, also argued before the panel,
saying that the court should hold DOMA to
heightened scrutiny because it targets "a
group with a long and deep history of
discrimination. "
The three judges on the panel directed most
of their questions at Mr. Clement and Mr.
Delery. But the questions were measured
and did not shed much light on how the
court might rule. The judges-Juan
Torruella, Michael Boudin and Sandra
Lynch, the First Circuit's chief judge-were
appointed by Presidents Ronald Reagan, the
elder George Bush and Bill Clinton,
respectively.
Afterward, Ms. Coakley said she could not
make predictions based on the judges'
questions but added: "When you look at, to
me, the thinness of the legal argument on the
other side and really the emotional and real
fact-based arguments made by the plaintiffs,
I'm confident that Judge Tauro will be
upheld."
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"Court Puts Review of DOMA Ruling on Hold"
The San Francisco Chronicle
July 27,2012
Bob Egelko
A U.S. appeals court put a San Francisco
woman's suit seeking federal benefits for
same-sex married couples on hold Friday
until the Supreme Court decides whether to
review the 1996 law that prohibited those
benefits.
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
San Francisco canceled the hearing it had
scheduled Sept. lain the case of Karen
Golinski, a lesbian attorney with the appeals
court who had challenged the government's
denial of family insurance coverage for her
wife.
The cOUli said it would wait to see whether
the nation's high court takes the case out of
its
hands
by
granting
the
Obamaadministration's
request
for
immediate review.
The administration, joined by Golinski, has
asked the Supreme Court to bypass the
appeals court and use the case to consider
the constitutionality of the Defense of
Marriage Act.
The law, known as DOMA, bars federal
family insurance coverage, joint tax filing,
immigration sponsorship and more than
1,000 other federal marital benefits for

same-sex couples who are legally married
under state law.
House Republican leaders have also asked
the Supreme Court to review DOMA in an
appeal of a federal Circuit Court lUling in
Boston that found the law unconstitutional.
Republicans hired attorneys to defend
DOMA after President Obama withdrew his
administration's support of the law in
February 2011.
In Golinski's case, U.S. District Judge
Jeffrey White of San Francisco IUled in
February that DOMA was a discriminatory
law, rooted in anti gay bias, and served no
legitimate
government purpose.
The
government has complied with the lUling by
extending insurance coverage to Amy
Cunninghis, whom Golinski wed in 2008
before Californians banned same-sex
marriage by passing Proposition 8.
House Republicans have appealed White's
ruling, arguing that withholding federal
benefits from same-sex couples was a
rational way to save federal funds,
encourage responsible child-rearing and
leave the volatile marriage issue to the
states.
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"83-year-old Asks Supreme Court to
Review Gay Marriage Ban"
Re1lters

July 16,2012
Terry Baynes
An ailing 83-year-old lesbian asked the
Supreme Court on Monday to hear her legal
challenge against a federal law that defines
marriage as a union between a man and
woman, attempting to place her case on a
fast-track to the top court.

But Windsor's lawyers argue that premature
review of her case by the Supreme Comt is
warranted since the issue is already before
the court. Also, Windsor suffers from a heart
condition that could end her life before the
case is resolved.

The suit, filed by Edith Schlain Windsor in
2010, targets the Defense of Marriage Act, a
law passed by the U.S. Congress in 1996
that denies federal benefits to lawfully
married same-sex couples.

The American Civil Libelties Union
originally filed the suit in New York on
behalf of Windsor, a former computer
programmer who married Thea Clara Spyer
in Toronto, Canada, in 2007. The two were
engaged in 1967.

Windsor's petition attempts to bypass the
U.S. Court of Appeals, which is slated to
hear the case in September.
With Windsor's filing, there are three
petitions pending before the Supreme Court
over the constitutionality of the Defense of
Marriage Act, an issue the high court could
take up in oral arguments as early as next
spring, said Windsor's lawyer Roberta
Kaplan, of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP.
"This case presents a question of exceptional
national impOliance: the constitutionality of
a statute, the Defense of Marriage Act
(,DOMA'), that daily affects the lives of
thousands of Americans," the petition said.
In June, a New York district court ruled in
Windsor's favor, finding that a central
provision of the law discriminates against
married same-sex couples. The case is now
on expedited appeal before the 2nd U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals.

Spyer died in 2009 after a long battle with
multiple sclerosis, leaving her property to
Windsor. Because the marriage was not
recognized under federal law, Windsor had
to pay more than $363,000 in federal estate
taxes, according to the suit.
Six states have legalized same-sex marriage
since DOMA went into effect, including
New York in 2011. But federal law and
programs do not recognize those marriages
because ofDOMA.
Windsor's attorneys argue that the federal
law violates the 14th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution which prohibits states
from denying people equal protection under
the laws.
Federal courts in New York, California and
Massachusetts
all
found
the
law
unconstitutional for different reasons,
applying varying standards of legal analysis.
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The Republican-controlled House of
Representatives, through its Bipartisan
Legal AdvisOlY Group (BLAG), is
defending the law, which the Obama
administration has largely abandoned.
President Barack Obama in 2011 instructed

the Justice Department to stop defending the
law in courts, finding it unconstitutional.
Paul Clement, a lawyer for BLAG, did not
immediately respond to a request for
comment on Windsor's petition.
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"Obama Team Won't Defend Defense
of Marriage Act"
USA Today
February 24,2011
Kevin Johnson and Joan Biskupic
The Obama administration will no longer
defend a law that bans federal recognition of
same-sex marriage - a major legal reversal
that reinvigorates a national debate over gay
rights.
The decision, outlined Wednesday by
Attorney General Eric Holder, represents the
administration's strongest legal advocacy for
the rights of gay men and lesbians, who
have strongly opposed the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA). The law defines
marriage as only between a man and a
woman.
"Much of the legal landscape has changed in
the 15 years since Congress passed
DOMA," Holder said. "The Supreme Court
has
ruled
that
laws
criminalizing
homosexual conduct are unconstitutional.
Congress has repealed the military's 'don't
ask, don't tell' policy .... But while both the
wisdom and the legality of DOMA will
continue to be the subject of extensive
litigation
and
public
debate,
this
administration will no longer assert its
constitutionality in court."
Holder said he was following President
Obama's lead and laid out reasons why
government action that treats gay people
differently than straight people is subject to
court scrutiny. He noted his action departed
from a practice of defending federal laws,
but said the legislative record that led to
"numerous
DOMA's
passage
had
expressions reflecting moral disapproval of
gays and lesbians and their intimate family
of
relationships-precisely
the
kind

stereotype-based thinking and animus the
Equal Protection clause is designed to guard
against."
"This is huge," said NOlihwestern
University
law
professor
Andrew
Koppelman, an expert on gays' legal rights.
"For the first time, the president of the
United States has taken the position that
laws that discriminate against gays are
unconstitutional. "
White House spokesman Jay Carney said
Obama is "still grappling" with his personal
views on gay marriage, but regards the law
as "unfair."
The action, prompted by a court-ordered
filing deadline in two pending legal
challenges to the law in New York and
Connecticut, triggered a divided response.
"While Americans want Washington to
focus on creating jobs and cutting spending,
the president will have to explain why he
thinks now is the appropriate time to stir up
a controversial issue," said Brendan Buck, a
spokesman for Republican House Speaker
John Boehner.
Gay-rights advocates lauded the move as a
landmark for gays' legal rights. Edith
Windsor, who is one of the challengers to
the federal law, said the administration had
"done the right thing."
Windsor, who in 2007 married Thea Spyer
in Canada, sued the government for refusing
to recognize her relationship and imposing a
$350,000 tax on Spyer's estate when she
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died in 2009. Had Spyer been a man,
Windsor argues, she would not have had to
pay the tax because spouses are exempt. "I
knew that the government would never be
able to justify that 1 had to pay a $350,000
estate tax simply because I was married to a

woman," she said.
Five states and D.C. allow gay people to
marry. On Wednesday, Hawaii Gov. Neil
Abercrombie, a Democrat, signed same-sex
civil unions into law.
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"Court Strikes Down Ban on Gay
Marriage in California"
The New York Times
February 7, 2012
Adam Nagourney

A federal appeals court panel on Tuesday
threw out a voter-approved ban on same-sex
marriage passed in 2008, upholding a lower
court's ruling that the ban, known as
Proposition 8, violated the constitutional
rights of gay men and lesbians in California.
The three-judge panel issued its ruling in
San Francisco, upholding a 2010 decision by
Judge Vaughn R. Walker, who had been the
chief judge of the Federal District Comi of
the Northern District of California but has
since retired. The panel found that
Proposition 8-passed by a vote of 52
percent to 48 percent-violated the equal
protection rights of two same-sex couples
who brought the suit. The proposition placed
a specific prohibition in the State
Constitution against marriage between two
people of the same sex.
But Tuesday's 2-to-l decision was much
more narrowly framed than the sweeping
ruling of Judge Walker, who asselied that
barring same-sex couples from marrying
was a violation of the equal protection and
due process clauses of the Constitution.
The two judges on Tuesday stated explicitly
that they were not deciding whether there
was a constitutional right for same-sex
couples to marry, instead ruling that the
disparate treatment of married couples and
domestic partners since the passage of
Proposition 8 violated the Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause.
"Although
the
Constitution
permits
communities to enact most laws they believe

to be desirable, it requires that there be at
least a legitimate reason for the passage of a
law that treats different classes of people
differently," Judge Stephen R. Reinhardt
wrote in the decision. "There was no such
reason that Proposition 8 could have been
enacted."
"All that Proposition 8 accomplished was to
take away from same-sex couples the right
to be granted marriage licenses and thus
legally to use the designation 'marriage, ",
the judge wrote, adding, "Proposition 8
serves no purpose, and has no effect, other
than to lessen the status and human dignity
of gay men and lesbians in California."
In his dissenting opinion, Judge N. Randy
Smith wrote that the court was overreaching
in nullifying a voter initiative.
Unlike the 2008 State Supreme Court
decision here overturning an earlier ban on
same-sex marriage, this decision is not about
to set off a race to the chapel by same-sex
couples. A stay imposed on Judge Walker's
original decision will remain in place, at
least for two weeks. Theodore B. Olson, one
of the lawyers who challenged the ban, said
he would seek to get the stay lifted; backers
of Proposition 8 said they would oppose
that.
Both sides in the case made clear that they
intended to take the case before the Supreme
Court in hopes of prompting it to settle once
and for all an issue that has been fought out
in comis, legislatures and ballot boxes since
at least a 1971 case in Minnesota. That said,
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there is no guarantee the court will take it.
The narrow parameters of the ruling's
reasoning-and the fact that it was written
to apply only to California-may prompt the
cOUli to wait for a clearer dispute before
weighing in.
Whatever the legal nuances of the
decision-and lawyers were battling about
how far-reaching it would prove to be-the
decision reverberated throughout political
circles, from the presidential campaign to
state legislatures.
Mitt Romney denounced the decision as an
attack by "unelected judges" on "traditional
marriage" and predicted that the Supreme
Court would decide the issue. "That
prospect underscores the vital importance of
this election and the movement to preserve
our values," he said.
Still, the decision by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, coming at a
time when Washington State seems poised
to become the seventh state to legalize
same-sex marriages, seems likely to add to
what members of both patiies said was a
sense of momentum. Chad Griffin, the
president of the American Foundation for
Equal Rights, which challenged Proposition
8, noted that polls in the past year had
shown public suppOli for same-sex marriage
steadily increasing, a significant change
from just a decade ago.
In New Jersey, State Senator Stephen M.
Sweeney, a Democrat and president of the
Senate, who abstained in a vote on a samesex marriage bill two years ago, is now
championing one that is to come up for a
vote next Tuesday. "Today's court ruling
simply reaffirmed what we already knew:
Marriage equality is right, and its time is
now," he said.

Proponents of Proposition 8 expressed
disappointment, but said they were not
surprised, given the nature of the Ninth
Circuit, which they view as liberal, and
predicted the ruling would fail before the
Supreme Court. Several said the decision
was narrow enough that it was more
unlikely now that the Supreme Court, if it
accepted the case, would use it to establish a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage.
"Since the beginning of this case, we've
known that the battle to preserve traditional
marriage will ultimately be won or lost not
here, but rather in the U.S. Supreme COUli,"
said Andrew P. Pugno, general counsel for
the ProtectMarriage.com coalition, which
was behind Proposition 8. "We will
immediately appeal this misguided decision
that disregards the will of more than seven
million Californians who voted to restore
marriage as the unique union of only a man
and woman."
Mr. Pugno said he had not decided whether
he would appeal to the Supreme Court or
ask a larger panel of the Ninth Circuit Court
to review this decision.
Douglas NeJaime, an associate professor at
Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, said the
narrowness of the decision could influence
the Supreme Court to take a road it often
favored: issuing narrow and incremental
decisions, not sweeping ones. "It's striking
that the court-or at least the two judgeswent out of their way to define the judgment
as narrowly as they could," he said.
Mr. Olson hailed the decision, saying it was
a "huge day," and noted that the judges had,
in the course of their 89-page majority
decision, systematically rebutted most of the
arguments that had been made against gay
marnage.
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"I'm not at all surprised that the court didn't
go further than it needed to go," he said. "If
it had, it might have been criticized for
reaching more than it should."
The emotional repercussions were on
display as Spencer Perry, 17, the son of one
of the couples who initiated the case, turned

out to praise it. "With this ruling, in the eyes
of the government, my family is finally
normal," he said as his mother looked on.
John Schwatiz contributed reporting from
New York, and Ian Lovett from Los
Angeles.

460

"Gay Marriage Fight May Hinge on Supreme
Court's Anthony Kennedy"
Los Angeles Times
February 8, 2012
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court has nine justices, but if
the constitutional fight over same-sex
marriage reaches them this year, the
decision will probably come down to just
one: a California Republican and Reaganera conservative who has nonetheless
written the comi's two leading gay rights
\
opinions.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 75, often
holds the court's deciding vote on the major
issues that divide its liberals and
conservatives. More often than not, that vote
has swung the court to the right. But on gay
rights, Kennedy has been anything but a
"culture wars" conservative.
One of his opinions lauded the intimacy
between same-sex couples and demanded
"respect for their private lives," provoking
Justice Antonin Scalia to accuse him of
having "signed on to the so-called
homosexual agenda."
is
a
California
establishment
"He
Republican with moderately libertarian
instincts," Stanford University law professor
Pamela Karlan said of Kennedy. "He travels
in circles where he has met and likes lots of
gay people."
Based on Kennedy's past opinions, Karlan is
confident that if the Supreme Court takes up
the issue of California's same-sex marriage
ban, "it meansProp. 8 is going down to
defeat," she said. "There is no way he will
take it to reinstate" the ban.
Not all court observers share her prediction,

but the uncertainty about how Kennedy
might vote may, by itself, be enough to deter
the high court from hearing an appeal of the
decision by the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals. Four justices must vote for the
court to consider a case, but a majority is
needed to issue a ruling.
When an appeal reaches the high court, the
four most conservative justices will face a
tough choice: Vote to have the court hear the
case and run the risk that Kennedy would
side with the more liberal justices to go
beyond the 9th Circuit decision and establish
a nationwide right to same-sex marriage. Or
turn the case aside, leaving same-sex
marriage intact in California but setting no
national precedent.
The man at the center of the speculation
grew up in a Catholic family in Sacramento,
where his father was a lawyer and lobbyist
in the Legislature. Family friends included
then-Gov. Earl Warren. As a Harvard law
student, the young Kennedy visited the
Supreme Court to meet with Warren, who
was then chief justice.
As a justice since 1988, Kennedy has
reflected at times
both styles of
Republicanism: the conservatism and
respect for states' rights of Reagan, who
appointed him, as well as Warren's devotion
to civil rights and fair treatment.
Two years ago he wrote the much-disputed
5-4 opinion in the Citizens United case that
said corporations and unions had a freespeech right to spend freely on election
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campaigns. But also that year Kennedy
wrote a 5-4 opinion that struck down as
cruel and unusual punishment the laws in
Florida and elsewhere under which juvenile
offenders were sent to prison for life for
crimes that did not involve a murder.
Sounding a bit like Warren, Kennedy said it
was unfair to close the prison doors forever
on youths who had gone wrong.
Eight years ago he wrote the decision that
declared unconstitutional laws in Texas and
elsewhere that made gays subject to arrest
for "deviate" sexual conduct. "The state
cannot demean" same-sex couples by
making their intimate, private conduct into a
crime, Kennedy said.
In 1996, he wrote an opinion in a Colorado
case called Romer vs. Evans that formed the
basis for Tuesday's 9th Circuit decision
striking down Proposition 8.
Colorado voters had approved an initiative
that stripped gays and lesbians of civil rights
protections under state and local ordinances.
Kennedy said the law could not stand
because it was "born of animosity" toward
homosexuals and took away their hard-won
legal rights.
In Tuesday's decision, Judge Stephen
Reinhardt of Los Angeles did not say gays
had a right to marry as a matter of equal
treatment. Instead, he focused on same-sex
marriage in California and repeated
Kennedy's view that voters could not take
away the rights gays had briefly won. "Prop.
8 singles out same-sex couples for unequal
treatment by taking away from them alone
the right to marry," Reinhardt wrote, citing
Romer vs. Evans.
Kennedy

sits

III

the

middle

ideological blocs likely to split evenly on the
question of same-sex marriage. The four
conservatives-Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr.and Justices Scalia, Clarence
Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr.-are likely
to oppose the 9th Circuit's decision on the
grounds that judges should not force such a
change in state law. The four liberalsJustices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G.
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena
Kagan-are likely to support the 9th
Circuit's decision as a matter of equal
treatment.
"Both sides will be nervous," said Michael
Dorf, a Cornell University law professor
who has clerked for Reinhardt and Kennedy.
The California-only approach taken by
Reinhardt would allow the high court to pass
up the case, but he and others predict the
justices will hear it. "This legalizes samesex marriage in the biggest state. That's a
big deal in itself," Dorf said.
Chapman University law professor John
Eastman said conservatives had not given up
on Kennedy.
"I know some people say Justice Kennedy
will ask: Should we stop the progress now? I
think Justice Kennedy will ask: Do we want
to put a stake in the heart of an institution,
marriage, that has done so much for
society?" he said.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, dean of UC
Irvine Law School, believes Kennedy will
play the crucial role and write a broader
opinion that undercuts other state laws
banning same-sex marriage. "This is a court
that wants to have the last word on major
legal issues," he said.

of two
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"Further Prop. 8 Review Denied by Court of Appeals"
SCOTUSblog
June 5, 2012
Lyle Denniston

The Ninth Circuit Court refused on Tuesday
to reconsider the decision in February
striking down California's Proposition 8, the
voter-approved ban on same-sex marriages
in the state. The Court, however, put the
case on hold for at least 90 days to allow the
proponents of the ballot measure to seek to
appeal to the Supreme Court. The denial
came over the dissents of three judges, who
called this a "momentous case" and argued
that the divided decision of a three-judge
panel had resulted from a "gross
misapplication" of a key Supreme Court
ruling on gay rights. One other judge
dissented, but did not join the three in their
objection ....
The ruling will set the stage for a major test
in the Supreme Court, although the panel
ruling is a narrow one that explicitly avoided
deciding whether gays and lesbians have a
constitutional right to get married. The two
judges who were in the majority in ruling
against Proposition 8 briefly defended the
narrowness of their decision in a concurring
opinion Tuesday.
After the panel decision, the supporters of
the measure had asked the full Circuit Court
to reconsider the case en bane. At the
request of an unidentified judge, a vote was
taken among the 25 judges eligible to vote
on the question, and a majority of 13 would
have been required to grant such review.
The final vote thus appeared to be 21-4,
because the dissenting member of the panel
favored en bane review, but did not join the
dissenting opinion by three other jUdges.

on hold, not only for 90 days, but also-if
the Justices grant review-for all of the time
that the Supreme Court takes to decide it,
that could make it unnecessary for the
backers of Proposition 8 to file a quick plea
for help from the Supreme Comi. The case
almost celiainly could not be heard, in any
event, until the new Term, starting October
1, since the Justices are likely to go into
summer recess later this month. If review
were granted, the case probably would not
even be heard until weeks after the
November elections this year.
The Ninth Circuit panel, and a three-judge
panel of the First Circuit, have now issued
gay marriage decisions that avoid the issue
of whether the Constitution assures gays and
lesbians of any right to civil marriage. In
both of the panel decisions, the two Circuit
Courts relied upon findings that excluding
homosexuals from equal access to marriage
or to the benefits of marriage was based
upon discrimination against them because of
their sexual identities. That approach is
keyed to a series of modern Supreme Court
rulings that have held that hostility to
homosexuality, or moral objection to it, is
not a valid basis for singling out gays and
lesbians for less favorable treatment in
public policy. The Supreme Court has never
recognized a right to same-sex marriage.
The First Circuit Court, unlike the Ninth
Circuit, did not strike down a state law, but
rather ruled unconstitutional a part of a 1996
federal law, the Defense of Marriage Act,
that provided federal benefits for marriage
only for opposite-sex couples.

Because the Circuit Court's decision is now
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Tuesday's developments in the Ninth Circuit
Court illustrated just how contentious the
issue of same-sex marriage remains in
American society. The three dissenting
judges who joined in a separate opinion
accused the majority of the court of having
"silenced any . . . respectful conversations"
about the issue; they noted that President
Obama, in a recent statement saying he
supports same-sex marriage, had also urged
the nation to talk about the issue in a
"respectful manner."
Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain wrote
the dissenting opinion, joined by Circuit
Judges Jay S. Bybee and Carlos Bea. Their
opinion said that the majority has now
"declared that animus must have been the
only conceivable motivation for a sovereign
state to have remained committed to a
definition of marriage that has existed for
millennia. . . . Even worse, we have
ovenuled the will of seven million
California Proposition 8 voters based on a
reading of Romer [v. Evans] that would be
unrecognizable to the Justices who joined it,
to those who dissented from it, and to the
judges from sister circuits who have since
interpreted it. We should not have so
roundly trumped California's democratic
process without at least discussing this
unparalleled decision as an en banc court."
Circuit Judge N. Randy Smith, who had
dissented from the panel lUling, said
Tuesday he would have granted en banc

review, but he wrote no opinion.
Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt, the author
of the panel decision, wrote a short
concurring opinion joined by his colleague
on the panel, Circuit Judge Michael Daly
Hawkins. They said they were puzzled by
Judge O'Scannlain's "unusual reliance" on
comments by President Obama, because,
they said, the President had made no
mention of "the narrow issue that we
decided."
They added: "We held only that under the
particular
circumstances
relating
to
California's Proposition 8, that measure was
invalid. In line with the rules governing
judicial resolution of constitutional issues,
we did not resolve the fundamental question
that both sides asked us to: whether the
Constitution prohibits the states from
banning same-sex marriage. That question
may be decided in the near future, but if so,
it should be in some other case, at some
other time."
Because the stay order was issued, no new
same-sex marriages may be performed in
California under the panel decision. Some
18,000 couples were married in California,
during the period between the time the state
Supreme COUl1 had ruled that such a right
existed under the state constitution and the
vote by California voters in November 2008
to take away that right for gays and lesbians.
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"Gay-Marriage Foes Seek High Court Review"
The Wall Street JOllrnal
July 31,2012
Jess Bravin
Opponents of same-sex marriage asked the
U.S. Supreme Court Tuesday to hear their
case for reinstating Califomia's Proposition
8, a voter initiative limiting marriage to
heterosexuals that was ruled unconstitutional
by lower courts.

federal court. Conservative activists behind
the initiative stepped in to defend
Proposition 8 after state officials, including
Republican Gov. Amold Schwarzenegger
and his Democratic successor, Edmund G.
(Jerry) Brown Jr., declined to do so.

The petition is the second major marriage
case to reach the justices' door this year,
after parties on both sides asked the high
court to settle the constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act, a 1996 federal law
denying benefits to same-sex spouses that
lower courts also found invalid.

The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
based in San Francisco, affirmed a district
Proposition
8
court
that
found
unconstitutional. But the Ninth Circuit
didn't find a general right to same-sex
marriage. Instead, its opinion focused on the
fact that the voter initiative withdrew from a
minority group a right previously recognized
by the state constitution. More than 18,000
marriage licenses were issued to same-sex
couples before voters rescinded their
marriage rights.

The court is widely expected to hear one or
both of the cases, with arguments likely by
early next year and a ruling before July.
Although both cases involve gay marriage,
each presents distinct legal issues, meaning
the justices need not recognize a broad right
to same-sex marriage even if they rule
Proposition 8 and the Defense of Marriage
Act unconstitutional.
In May 2008, the Califomia Supreme C0U11
held that the state constitution, which
guarantees individuals liberty, privacy and
equal protection of the laws, required
of
same-sex
marriage.
recognition
Opponents quickly qualified a ballot
initiative to amend the state constitution to
limit marriage to heterosexual couples and
the measure, Proposition 8, passed in
November 2008.
Same-sex marriage advocates, led by the
bipartisan legal team of Ted Olson and
David Boies, challenged Proposition 8 in

The court based its ruling on a 1996
Supreme Court precedent by Justice
Anthony Kennedy, which said Colorado
couldn't withdraw protections for gays and
lesbians once they were granted.
In their Supreme Court filing, Proposition 8
backers said the Ninth Circuit got it wrong.
Unlike the "exceptionally harsh and
unprecedented character" of the Colorado
measure, Califomia law remained friendly to
gays and lesbians, they said, recognizing
domestic partnerships nearly equivalent to
heterosexual marriage.
California voters made a rational choice in
deciding that the label marriage should
apply only to heterosexual partnerships, the
petition says, because the concept evolved to
channel "the unique procreative potential of
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sexual relationships between men and
women" into family units whose stability is
reinforced by law.

Proposition 8 trial in 2010 that permitting
gays and lesbians to marry would be
harmful to children.

For support, the Proposition 8 team invoked
President Barack Obama, who, in an
interview announcing his personal support
for same-sex marriage, said those on the
other side weren't "mean-spirited."

In June, however, Mr. Blankenhorn, founder
of the Institute for American Values, said he
had come to accept gay marriage as more
beneficial than harmful to society. He wrote
in a New York Times op-ed that "to my
deep regret, much of the opposition to gay
marriage seems to stem, at least in part, from
an underlying anti-gay animus."

The petition also cites an expert, David
Blankenhorn,
who
testified
at the
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"A New Test on Gay Rights"
SCOTUSblog
July 10,2012
Lyle Denniston

With the Supreme Court's next Term
already shaping up as a historic one on the
rights of gays and lesbians, Arizona officials
have raised a significant new question for
the Justices: if a state bans gay marriage, can
it then take away unwed same-sex couples'
access to state benefits that go only to those
who can marry? The Ninth Circuit Court
said no, but dissenting judges argued that the
ruling amounted to a ban on states acting to
protect a traditional view of marriage. That
complaint may add to the Supreme Court's
willingness to hear the state's new appeal
(Brewer v. Diaz, filed last week).
The case illustrates a trend that is beginning
to develop in lower cOUlis dealing with
issues of gay marriage: they are establishing
new rights to legal equality for such couples,
without taking the constitutional step of
creating an explicit new right for gays and
lesbians to marry. That was what lower
cOUlis did in two cases that have already
reached
the
Court,
involving
the
constitutionality of the federal Defense of
Marriage Act, and in a case due to reach the
COUli soon on California's "Proposition 8"
ban on such marriages. It happened again in
the Arizona case newly arrived at the Court,
although the dissenters said that the decision
there implicates states' power to limit
marriage rights.
Arizona is one of 39 states that ban samesex marriage. In November 2008, its voters
approved "Proposition 120," declaring that
"only a union of one man and one woman
shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in
this state."

That vote came only seven months after the
state government changed policy, and began
offering health care benefits to "domestic
patiners" of state employees-a new
opportunity given equally to unmarried
couples, whether or not they were gay. Up to
that time, those benefits were available only
to married spouses and their children. The
2008 change made a "domestic partner" an
eligible dependent of a state worker, and
defined domestic partner generally as a
person living in the same home with a state
employee who had been living there for at
least a year, was not married, and was at
least 18 years old.
Ten months after "Proposition 120" had
passed, the Arizona legislature passed a law
that was to go into effect on January 1 oflast
year, wiping out coverage for all domestic
paliners, gay or not. Titled "Section 0," it
said simply that "dependent" in state benefit
law meant only a spouse or an eligible child
(one under age 19 or, if a full-time student,
under age 23). The state legislature adopted
Section 0, concluding that coverage of
domestic patiners was costing the state
upwards of $4 million a year, and the state
was faced with a serious budget crisis, with
was one of 40
a rising deficit. Section
provisions that were adopted as cuts to the
state budget.
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Section 0, however, has never gone into
effect, because a group of gay and lesbian
state workers sued to challenge it and, in the
meantime, got a court order blocking its
enforcement.
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Their lawsuit, based on the equal legal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment, argued that the loss of health
care for their domestic partners, and for the
children of their domestic partners, was
discriminatory. Since state workers who
were not gay could keep their benefits if
they got married, while gay workers were
barred from marrying, the effect was to
single out gays for the denial of benefits that
they formerly had enjoyed. The loss, they
argued, would be a significant financial and
emotional hardship. One example that
federal courts cited was of a University of
Arizona professor who had been in a
committed relationship for 22 years with her
partner, who could not work because of a
need to care for the partner's 89-year-old
mother. The partner had signed up for
family health coverage provided by the
state, needing it for herself because she has
asthma and could not get private health
insurance. She would lose that coverage
under Section O.
A federal judge ruled that the challengers
were likely to succeed when their case was
tried, and blocked Section O. The judge
found that, while that provision did not end
coverage only for domestic partners of gays,
but the partners of all state employees, it
would have a "discriminatory effect" on
gays because of the state's marriage ban. A
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
agreed. The state had argued that the
provision was justified by the need to save
state funds, a need to reduce the cost of
running the domestic partner benefit
program, and a desire to promote marriage
in its traditional form. The Circuit Court
panel rejected all of those reasons,
concluding that none of them could survive
constitutional challenge, even with the cOUli
only applying the least-demanding standard:
rational basis review. State employees and
their families have no constitutional right to

benefits, the panel conceded, but it added:
"When a state chooses to provide such
benefits, it may not do so in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner that adversely affects
particular groups that may be unpopular."
When the full 28-judge Circuit Court
refused to reconsider the case en bane, the
two dissenting judges argued that there was
no evidence that the Arizona legislature had
passed Section 0 in order to discriminate
against state employees who are gay or
lesbian, and such an intent would be
necessary to make the cut-off of benefits
unconstitutional. "It rests only on budgetary
considerations," the dissenters contended.
Further, the dissenters argued, the panel
decision was based upon the "veiled but
unmistakable" conclusion that "rules
benefitting only traditional marriage serve
no conceivable rational purpose." The
decision thus set a precedent for striking
down efforts by states "to promote
traditional marriage," the dissenting opinion
asserted.
Arizona's petltIOn to the Supreme Court
raises three questions: whether Section 0 is
unconstitutional though it was written in a
neutral way and there is no evidence of
discrimination based on sexual orientation,
whether the state had justified it adequately
as eliminating the added expense and
administrative burden of covering all
domestic partners, and whether the fact that
Arizona bars same-sex marriage is a valid
basis for finding Section 0 to be biased.
The Ninth Circuit ruling, state officials
argued, was flawed on the merits, conflicts
with rulings ofthe Supreme Court on how to
judge discrimination under the Fomieenth
Amendment, conflicts with rulings of other
state courts on similar issues, and ignores
the state's valid reasons for Section 0"conserving state resources and funds and
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promoting traditional marriage." Indirectly,
the petition added, picking up on the
dissenting Circuit Court judges, the panel
decision has struck down Arizona's state
laws and constitutional provision limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples.
Noting that the Ninth Circuit had also struck
down California's "Proposition 8" ban on
same-sex marriage in that state, the Arizona
petition said the Ninth Circuit decision in
the domestic partners case was "in some

ways even more breathtaking" because the
"Proposition 8" ruling did not reach the
question of the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage, while this decision does, at least
indirectly.
The Arizona state employees who filed the
challenge have 30 days to respond to the
new petition, unless that time is extended.
The Supreme Court is not expected to act
upon the case during its summer recess.
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"Same-sex Partner Benefits Can't Be Cut Off"
The San Francisco Chronicle
September 7,2011
Bob Egelko

A state can't selectively withdraw benefits
from same-sex couples, a federal appeals
cOUli ruled Tuesday in blocking Arizona's
attempt to deny health coverage to the
domestic partners of gay and lesbian state
employees.
When a state provides health care to its
employees, "it may not do so in an arbitrary
or discriminatory manner that adversely
affects particular groups that may be
unpopular," said the Ninth U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in San Francisco.
The 3-0 ruling upheld a federal judge's
injunction against a law that was signed by
Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer in 2009 and was
scheduled to take effect this year. Brewer's
predecessor,
Janet
Napolitano,
had
authorized health benefits for state
employees' domestic partners in April 2008
before leaving to become President Obama's
Homeland Security secretary.
Tara Borelli of Lambda Legal, a lawyer for
nine lesbian and gay state employees in
Arizona, said the ruling is the first by a
federal appeals court "to recognize that
equal pay for equal work means that lesbian
and gay state employees should get the same

family health coverage as their heterosexual
co-workers."
Matthew Benson, a spokesman for Brewer,
said the governor is considering a further
appeal. He said Brewer and Arizona
lawmakers had "eliminated domestic partner
benefits across the board for both gay and
straight couples in response to the state
budget crisis."
The court said, however, that the cutoff had
a discriminatory impact because only
opposite-sex couples could restore their
benefits by getting married. The ruling
provides health coverage only to the
domestic partners of gay and lesbian
couples-the sole plaintiffs in the suit-an
impact that
Benson said promotes
inequality.
The cOUli also said the plaintiffs presented a
study showing a cutoff of benefits to samesex partners would achieve only minimal
savings-no more than $1.8 million a year
for fewer than 300 pminers in a state with a
$7.8 billion budget, according to court
documents-and the state had offered no
rebuttal.
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